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he EU’s foreign policy instruments are limited to ‘soft power’. This is the main reason why 
the EU’s reaction to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its subsequent military intervention 
in Eastern Ukraine consisted primarily of the imposition of economic sanctions.   
In principle these sanctions were wide-ranging, including asset freezes, travel restrictions, the 
suspension of development loans from the EBRD, limited access to primary and secondary capital 
markets in the EU (for targeted Russian financial institutions, energy and defence companies), 
export and import bans on trade in arms, an export ban on dual-use goods and reduced access to 
sensitive technologies and services linked to oil production.1   The sanctions that have attracted the 
most attention have been the bans on trade in certain goods, introduced in July and September 2014.   
In response to these EU measures, Russia announced ‘counter-sanctions’, prohibiting the import of 
certain perishable goods (meat, fish and vegetables) from countries adhering to the EU sanctions. 
The decision process leading to the sanctions has been very difficult for the EU, with some member 
states claiming that they have been particularly hard hit because exports to Russia are important to 
their economies.  
We show, however, that the economic cost in terms of lost exports, and thus potentially jobs, has 
been negligible. 
Those claiming that the sanctions imposed a high cost on their economies can point to the fact that 
exports to Russia have in many cases fallen by 50%, and sometimes more.  Prima facie, it thus appears 
that the sanctions (plus the Russian counter-sanctions) have had a strong negative impact on trade 
(and thus potentially on jobs in the countries trading most intensively with Russia). 
However, this first impression of a high cost from sanctions is completely misleading.  Overall 
Russian imports have halved because the oil price has fallen by over 50%, pushing the Russian 
economy into a deep recession (see Figure 1).  The real question is thus whether EU exports to Russia 
have fallen by more than they would have in the absence of the sanctions given the recession in 
Russia. 
                                                   
1 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/ 
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Figure 1. Russian imports of goods, January 2012-May 2015 ($ mil) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia database (2015). 
There exists a simple way to disentangle the impact of the recession from the effects of EU sanctions 
(plus counter-sanctions) on (bilateral merchandise) trade: one has to look only at the share of the EU 
(and other countries that imposed sanctions, like the US or Japan) in Russian imports. If these shares 
have not changed significantly, sanctions cannot have played a major role in undermining trade 
flows between the EU and Russia. The common factors (oil prices, recession in Russia, etc.) affected 
all exporters to Russia. 
Figure 2 shows the trend in these shares, i.e. of Russian goods imported from the EU-28, the US and 
Japan, compared to total Russian imports.  
If the sanctions had had a strong impact on trade, one should find that the share of the EU in overall 
Russian imports has declined after the sanctions were imposed.  However, we find that the EU’s 
share in Russian imports has been fairly stable (slightly above 40% of the overall Russian goods 
imports) until the end of 2014, and then it declined somewhat, down to 37% in May 2015. This 
decline of about 3 percentage points is equal to a fall in exports (from the EU to Russia) of less than 
$500 million on a monthly basis.  
The share of the US (in Russian imports) has actually increased after the sanctions, reaching 10% in 
May 2015, while Japan is quite stable at around 4% for the whole period under analysis.  The data 
for the US present an intriguing puzzle in that the US has been among the most vociferous 
champions of sanctions against Russia, but this stance does not seem to have affected US exports. 
For Japan there is no evidence that the sanctions have had any measurable impact on trade. 
The small loss in market share for the EU seems to be mirrored by an increase in a number of smaller 
exporters. But major exporting nations that did not participate in the sanctions, such as China or 
South Korea, have also lost market shares. There is thus no evidence that the sanctions led to a broad-
based shift in trade patterns. 
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Figure 2. Russian imports of goods by partner countries, Jan 2012-May 2-15 (% of total) 
 
Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics (2015). 
This is also confirmed by looking at country-specific trade flows. Indeed, in Figure 3, we observe 
that the share of Russian imports from the top five EU member states (Germany, France, Italy, 
Poland and the Netherlands) and Turkey has not changed significantly since the imposition of the 
sanctions.  
Figure 2. Russian imports of goods by selected EU partners and Turkey, Jan 2012-May 2015 (% of total) 
 
Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics (2015). 
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A recent study published by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO)2 also finds that the 
sanctions and counter-sanctions had a limited impact, although it has been widely cited in a different 
sense, as discussed below. The WIFO study argues that a potential sizable trade loss could be the 
result of worsening relations between the two economies, but that it not directly linked to the 
economic sanctions.  
The WIFO study also raised some concerns over the spill-over of the sanctions and the generally 
more strained relations between the EU and Russia on trade in services, especially tourism.  The 
data do not bear this out, however, as shown in Figure 4. On the contrary, the share of the EU in 
Russian imports of services has actually increased (slightly) over the last few months.  There is thus 
absolutely no evidence that political tensions have had any negative impact on trade in services. 
Figure 3. Annual Russian imports of services by partner countries, 2006-14 (% of total) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia database (2015). 
We have looked only at the reduction in trade flows between the EU and Russia.  The consequences 
for valued added and employment are more difficult to gauge. Losing export sales does not 
represent a cost per se. For example, if a company that produces  a  generic consumer  good  like  
food  or  even  cars  sells  less  in  Russia, one  should not  count  the reduction in sales as a loss. For 
generic goods that have a global market, a loss of sales in one market can be compensated for by 
higher sales in another.  An economic loss arises only if a firm produces some specialised good that 
does not have a market anywhere else with specialised capital, which cannot be used in the 
production of some other goods or services.  Gros (2014)3 argues that this is unlikely to be the case 
in the large majority of the goods or services exported from the EU to Russia.   This argument should 
apply in particular to the agri-food sector, which was the one sector singled out by Russian counter-
sanctions. 
All in all it seems that the EU’s sanctions against Russia had a very limited impact on the EU 
economy. These sanctions must therefore be considered more as a political signal, than an important 
economic weapon. 
                                                   
2 E. Christensen, O. Fritz and G. Streicher (2015), “Effects of the EU-Russia Economic Sanctions on Value 
Added and Employment in the European Union and Switzerland”, WIFO Study, Austrian Institute of 
Economic Research, Vienna, July. 
3 D. Gros (2014), “A European sanctions compensation fund?”, CEPS Commentary,  CEPS, Brussels, 12 August. 
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